Adolescent girls in Lebanon

The state of the evidence

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## Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Demographic and Health Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender based violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>LBP</td>
<td>Lebanese Pound</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MICS</td>
<td>Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PISA</td>
<td>Programme for International Student Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHE</td>
<td>Reproductive Health Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Palestine Refugees from Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRH</td>
<td>Sexual and Reproductive Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWMENA</td>
<td>Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAWG</td>
<td>Violence Against Women and Girls</td>
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Adolescent girls in Lebanon: The State of the Evidence

Executive Summary

Adolescent girls living in Lebanon are an especially diverse population. The lives of native Lebanese girls, and Palestinian and Syrian refugee girls, are all shaped by regional culture and its highly patriarchal gender norms, as well as Lebanon's political and social realities. These reflect the country's system of confessionalism, as well as the ongoing Syrian crisis, which has left Lebanon hosting the world's highest per capita refugee population. Yet in many ways the lives of Lebanese, Palestinian and Syrian girls are markedly different.

This situation analysis attempts to pull together the thin and fractured evidence base about adolescent girls living in Lebanon as both a stand-alone resource and to inform the qualitative and participatory research that the GAGE programme is initiating in 2018. The paper begins with a brief overview of the broader Lebanese context, as well as a short history of the Syrian crisis. It then turns to an analysis of the existing evidence as to how adolescents are faring vis-à-vis the capability domains laid out in the GAGE conceptual framework. These are: education and learning, physical health and nutrition, bodily integrity and freedom from violence, psychosocial wellbeing, voice and agency, and economic empowerment. Where possible we disaggregate between populations of adolescent girls in our exploration of each of these domains.

Lebanese context

Lebanon is an upper-middle income country with an economy considered one of the wealthiest in the Middle East. Most development indicators speak to its 'high' level of development. For example, its youth literacy rate is 99%, nearly 90% of the population has a mobile phone subscription (USAID, 2017) and its fertility rate is only 1.7 births per woman (World Bank, 2018). However, the country is also characterised by a high level of diversity and inequality. In addition to being the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region's most religiously diverse country, with 18 recognised faiths, Lebanon was also recently ranked sixth in the world for its wealth inequality (Oxfam, 2017). Half of the country's wealth is owned by 0.3% of the population (ibid.).

Still dealing with the impacts of its own civil war (1975-1990), which left it with the world's fourth highest debt-to-GDP ratio (CIA Factbook, 2017), Lebanon has been further transformed by the conflict that has gripped Syria since 2011. A small country, roughly the size of Montenegro, Lebanon is hosting almost 1 million registered Syrian refugees1, 175,000 registered Palestine refugees (PCBS, 2017) and tens – perhaps hundreds – of thousands of unregistered refugees (World Bank, 2016). The sheer magnitude of these flows has overwhelmed Lebanon's ability to cope, with negative implications not only for refugees themselves, but also for the most vulnerable Lebanese families. Kevin Watkins (2016) reports that extreme poverty in Lebanon has risen from 10% to 15% since the crisis began.

Adolescent girls

Adolescent girls living in Lebanon have disparate experiences and needs, most of which remain largely unexplored. While Syrian refugee girls appear to be the most vulnerable – across all capability domains – adolescent girls in general face sharp limits on their voice, choice and control. More specifically, they face challenges in realising their capabilities in terms of:

Education and learning

- Despite the fact that Lebanon is an upper-middle income country, even before the Syrian crisis primary education was not quite universal – in part because the capacity of government schools never recovered from the country's civil war. In 20112, the primary net enrolment rate for girls was only 88% (vs. 95% for boys). At the secondary level that same year, both girls and boys had a net enrolment of 70%. Girls are significantly more likely to attend university than boys (46% vs.

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1 In January 2018. Figure from the inter-agency Information Sharing Portal. (http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122)
2 Because more recent figures include Syrian children, who have far lower enrollment rates, 2011 statistics more accurately reflect the native born Lebanese population than more recent statistics.
Most adolescent Syrian refugee girls are out of school. While 2017 was a watershed year for Syrian children’s enrolment in school – with the national average for children aged six to 14 jumping from 52% to 70% in only one year – progress was overwhelmingly concentrated in younger children and earlier grades (UNHCR et al., 2018). The net enrolment rate for children aged 15 to 17 was only 22% – though heavily in girls’ favour given a gender parity index of over 1.5. Most children remain out of school due to lack of space and cost, though restrictive gender norms and violence also play a part.

UNRWA educates Palestine refugee children living in Lebanon. At the primary level, girls and boys were equally likely to be enrolled at 97%, while at the preparatory level girls begin to significantly outnumber boys. Nationally, nearly 90% of girls and only 79% of boys were enrolled in preparatory school. At the secondary level, 65% of girls and only 58% of boys were enrolled (Chaaban et al., 2016).

Palestine refugees from Syria are comparatively more likely to go to school than Syrian refugees in Lebanon – because they have access to UNRWA schools. At the primary level, 89.6% of girls and 87% of boys are enrolled. At the preparatory level, 75.2% of girls and 64.3% of boys are enrolled. At the secondary level, 42.9% of girls and 28.4% of boys are enrolled (ibid.).

Physical health and nutrition

Evidence about Syrian refugee girls’ physical health is thin and fractured, with much of the research found in academic sources failing to disaggregate between adolescent girls and boys. Much of what we know comes from the 2011 Global school-based student health survey. That study highlights a growing disparity between the one-third of children who attend government schools and their better-off peers, who attend private schools. Girls attending private schools have better nutrition, but are far more likely to consume alcohol. Girls’ reproductive health issues are especially under-researched, though evidence suggests that the majority of adolescents would like more, and more timely, information than they now have.

While research aimed at the broader Palestine refugee population has included modules on both ill health and disability, there has apparently been no disaggregation that permits exploring the experiences of adolescent girls – or even the broader categories of adolescents has found that up to a third of young women in Western Bekaa were married before the age of 18 and that a quarter of girls between the ages of 15 and 18 were already married, with poverty born of conflict and displacement a primary driver (UNFPA, 2017). Evidence suggests that sexual harassment and violence are common and that over half of Syrian refugee girls have ‘never once felt safe’ (UNFPA et al., 2014).

Evidence about threats to Palestine refugee girls’ bodily integrity is almost absent. UNWRA (2016) reports that forced marriage is rare among longer-term Palestine refugees, only 2%. It is far higher, 14%, among Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS). The current incidence of child marriage is unknown, though likely significant given that UNRWA (2015) reports that 12% of pregnant or breastfeeding PRS are under the age of 20.

Bodily integrity and freedom from violence

It is difficult to ascertain the type and magnitude of threats to Lebanese girls’ bodily integrity. On the one hand, child marriage is rare among native Lebanese girls and research has found that the vast majority of adults ‘completely reject’ the idea that a man could be justified in beating his wife (IFES and IWPR, 2010d). On the other hand, there is no common minimum age for marriage across the country, because different religious communities have their own personal status laws (Girls Not Brides, 2017), and there appears to be no national level research that has focused on girls’ and women’s experiences of gender-based violence (GBV).

Syrian refugee girls face myriad threats to their bodily autonomy. In addition to growing violence at home, driven by increased stress levels, child marriage and sexual harassment are both fairly common. Research
or young women (Chaaban et al., 2016). Even less is known about Lebanon’s PRS population, only 6% of which is food secure (ibid.).

**Psychosocial wellbeing**

- Like their peers in other countries, Lebanese girls appear to be vulnerable to depression, anxiety and suicidal ideation. Research has found that girls are more vulnerable than boys and that girls at public schools appear more vulnerable than those attending private schools — perhaps because their families are under more financial stress or perhaps because they are less likely to believe that their parents understand their problems and worries. Evidence also suggests that restrictive gender norms leave girls socially isolated and deprive them of access to psychosocial support.

- Syrian girls’ psychosocial wellbeing is under continual assault. UNFPA et al.’s (2014) survey of Syrian youth found that only 5% of adolescent girls between the ages of 15 and 18 are satisfied with their lives. Only 1% of girls are happy. Research has also found that girls have very little respite from their misery. Restrictive norms, which require them to remain sequestered from males who are not their relatives, mean that few have any access to psychosocial support. For example, only 5% spend time with their friends (UNFPA et al., 2014; see also Search for Common Ground, 2014; Anera, 2014).

- There is very little information available about the psychosocial wellbeing of Palestine refugee girls, regardless of whether they are longer-term residents of Lebanon or from Syria. Existent evidence suggests that nearly all adolescents (98%) experience at least some level of uncertainty about security (Afifi et al. 2013) and that the majority (80%) have experienced at least one traumatic event (Afifi et al. 2016). On the other hand, the 2011 Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) found that of Palestine refugee girls and young women aged 15 to 24, 54% were satisfied with life.

**Voice and agency**

- Research focussed on the voice and agency of adolescent girls living in Lebanon is effectively non-existent. Search for Common Ground’s 2014 survey, which included both Lebanese and Syrian girls (and young women) between the ages of 15 and 25, appears to be the only study which has asked specific questions about girls’ decision-making. It found that girls are deeply constrained by social perceptions of how they should behave, do not feel that their decisions are their own, have limited mobility and believe that they have little role to play in their communities. Syrian refugee girls have particularly limited voice and agency, with empirical evidence highlighting that even school enrolment and child marriage decisions are not their own.

- We were unable to locate any sources that spoke to the voice and agency of Palestine refugee girls in Lebanon — or even to the larger space open to women or adolescents.

- A small study found that most adolescents and young people have access to the internet, primarily on mobile phones, and that while adolescents have little parental oversight, girls are facing fewer online risks than boys. (SMEX, 2017).

**Economic empowerment**

- Lebanese adolescent girls and young women are very unlikely to engage in economic activity. This is in part because they are likely to be in school through university, in part due to the country’s high rate of youth unemployment and in part because social norms dictate that girls should not work (Global Communities, 2016; Search for Common Ground, 2014). Only 7% of girls between the ages of 15 and 19 are in the labour market (compared to 28% of boys) and girls are twice as likely to be unemployed as boys (30% vs. 17%) (Global Communities, 2016). Labour market participation rates for young adults aged 20 to 24 are 35% and 63% respectively. There appears to be no information about Lebanese adolescent girls’ access to financial assets or services.

- Very little is known about Syrian girls’ access to economic empowerment either. UNFPA et al. (2014) found that 94% of girls between the ages of 15 and 18 are not employed, compared to only 61% of boys of the same age. It also found that girls make 30% less than boys (ibid.).

- Palestine refugee girls’ access to economic empowerment is also unexplored. While we know that women’s labour force participation rate is far lower than men’s (16.9% vs. 69.2), that women’s unemployment rate is higher than men’s (32% vs. 21%), and that women are more likely than men to have contract employment (largely through UNRWA and NGOs) (27.4% vs. 10.1%), we know nothing about adolescent girls (or boys) specifically (Chaaban et al., 2016).
Conclusions and ways forward
We know comparatively little about adolescent girls in Lebanon. The only capability domain about which we have high-quality evidence that is disaggregated by gender, age and nationality/refugee status is education. While we know that girls are socially isolated and are more likely than boys to be depressed and anxious, we know far more about Syrian refugee girls’ psychosocial wellbeing. There is similarly little research on girls’ physical health and nutrition. Their sexual and reproductive health needs remain particularly opaque, due to conservative gender norms that largely preclude research. We know almost nothing about girls’ bodily integrity and freedom from violence, outside of the fact that Syrian refugee girls are highly vulnerable to child marriage and sexual harassment. Girls’ access to voice and agency and economic empowerment also remain almost completely unexplored.

Two things stand out about the evidence base on adolescent girls living in Lebanon. First, gender is all but invisible amid the country’s sectarian divisions. The Central Administration of Statistics’ English language ‘Gender Statistics’ webpage is a case in point. Nearly every link is to presentations prepared in 2010. Second, Palestine refugee adolescent girls living in Lebanon have been almost entirely overlooked. While granting that the recent census found that the population is a fraction of its original size, and observing that the government’s position on Palestine refugees likely makes research difficult, it is notable that there is almost no evidence on Palestine adolescent girls.

GAGE is poised to begin filling these gaps.

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1 Introduction

Understanding the lives of adolescent girls living in Lebanon – whether they be native Lebanese or refugees – requires substantial contextualisation. It is not only necessary to have some sense of Lebanon’s own history and development, including its recent civil war and its longer-term experience hosting Palestine refugees, but also to have a basic understanding of the drivers of Syria’s civil war, as those dynamics help to explain the fragility of Lebanon’s Syrian population (see Box 1). It is also critical to understand the size and characteristics of the broader Syrian and Palestine refugee populations.

This situation analysis provides an overview of these context dynamics before reviewing the specific evidence available on adolescent girls’ realities in Lebanon. It is important to highlight that this was a desk-based review exercise drawing on publicly available literature and that ongoing research on adolescent girls is not included, but will be reviewed for future GAGE publications.

1.1 The Lebanese context

1.1.1 Lebanon’s civil war

Lebanon before 1975 was a different place to the Lebanon of today. Beirut was known as the ‘Paris of the Middle East’ due to the success of both its banking and tourism sectors. Lebanon was not only a refuge for the region’s religious minorities (see Figure 1) but was considered by Freedom House to be one of only two politically free countries in the MENA region (along with Israel). The Lebanese civil war, which lasted from 1975 until 1990, shattered the country

Box 1: Syria yesterday, Syria today

The crisis in Syria started well before the 2011 onset of its civil war and arguably has as much to do with rain – or the lack thereof – as it does with politics. Syria is a small, arid country. Less than a quarter of its land is arable and it is subject, outside a narrow band of land around the Mediterranean, to extreme temperature swings and dust storms. Despite its unfavourable geo-climactic location, Syria a decade ago was a markedly different place. Not only was it a haven for Palestinian, Lebanese and Iraqi refugees – allowing them unfettered access to work and services – but its population was overwhelmingly literate and its GDP/capita was roughly equal to Jordan’s (about $5,000).

In 2006, the rain stopped. By 2010, crop failures had reached 76%, while 85% of livestock had perished and over 900,000 farmers had lost their livelihoods. For a country that had been overwhelmingly agricultural, this was devastating. UN experts estimated that immediately before the war, some 20-30% of the Syrian population had already been reduced to extreme poverty and the World Bank reported that its GDP/capita had fallen by over 40% (to $2,900). Most Syrians went into the civil war stretched past the breaking point.

The Syrian civil war began as part of the Arab Spring, with demonstrations aimed at President Bashar al-Assad in early 2011. Driven by violent government retaliation, which has included barrel bombs and chemical weapons, the conflict is being fought by several different factions, including the government and its allies, Sunni Arab rebels, Syrian Democratic Forces, and various jihadist groups – including the Islamic State. It is also important to recognise the complex role of geopolitical drivers in perpetuating the conflict (for further details see Baczko et al., 2018).

Today’s Syria, which has been declared by the UN to be enduring the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21st century, is unrecognizable. In addition to the death toll, which is approaching a half a million, UNDP (2018) estimates that 45% of its population is displaced, 45.2% of its school-age children are no longer in school, and its GDP loss since 2011 is over 64%. The country’s current poverty rate is estimated at 85.2%.i

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i Baczko et al., 2018; Selby et al., 2017; Polk, 2013.
ii Polk, 2013.
iii UNDP, 2018.
both literally and figuratively. In addition to 150,000 people dead and up to 1 million displaced, Lebanon is still saddled with the debts it incurred to rebuild its infrastructure and has the world’s fourth highest debt-to-GDP ratio.\(^6\)

The civil war was driven by complex geopolitical dynamics and sectarian violence which the country’s delicate system of confessionalism had tried to prevent. Formulated in 1943, when Lebanon’s parliamentary democracy was formed as French colonial rule came to an end, that system formalises power sharing and reserves specific government positions for members of specific religious groups (e.g. the president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim, the speaker of the chamber of deputies must be a Shia Muslim, and the deputy speaker of parliament must be Eastern Orthodox), based on population figures from 1932. When it failed, Lebanon descended into 15 years of war that included both Syrian occupation and Israeli invasion. While the conflict ended in 1990, Lebanon has seen sporadic violence continue over the last 28 years, including another war with Israel in 2006, and fighting between the government and Hezbollah that resulted in the seizure of parts of Beirut in 2008. The Syrian civil war has inflamed sectarian tensions across the region and there has been intermittent fighting in parts of Lebanon since 2012. While Freedom House notes that there have been some recent improvements, with 2016 seeing the election of a president after the post sat vacant for two years, the rule of law continues to be weak.\(^7\)

### 1.1.2 Modern Lebanon ex the Syrian crisis

Lebanon is an upper middle income country. While estimates vary, the World Bank reports that in 2010 Lebanon’s GDP/capita was nearly $8,860,\(^8\) compared to a regional average of $7,100. While even before the Syrian crisis its poverty rate was high, 27.4% at the national poverty line in 2012\(^9\) (compared to a rate of 13.3% in Jordan that same year\(^10\)), most development indicators speak to its ‘high’ level of development. For example, its youth literacy rate is 99%\(^11\), nearly 90% of the population has a mobile phone subscription\(^12\) and its fertility rate is only 1.7 children/women.\(^13\) Lebanon’s 2015 Human Development Indicator value was 0.763 – slightly higher than Jordan’s, which was 0.741\(^14\) – and ranked 76th out of 188 countries. Notably, in addition to being MENA’s most religiously diverse country, with 18 recognised faiths, Lebanon also ranks sixth in the world for its wealth inequality.\(^15\) Half of the country’s wealth is owned by 0.3% of the population (ibid.).

In many ways, however, Lebanese women do not enjoy the same high level of development as their male peers.

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\(^6\) CIA, 2017.

\(^7\) Freedom House, 2017.


\(^10\) OCHA, 2012.


\(^12\) USAID, 2017.


\(^14\) UNDP, 2016.

\(^15\) Oxfam, 2017.
While Lebanon is ranked in the highest of five categories on the Gender Development Index,\textsuperscript{16} which indicates that women’s standard of living, access to education and life expectancy are similar to those of men, it is ranked 83rd on the Gender Inequality Index because of women’s extremely low rates of political representation (only 31%) and their comparatively low rates of labour force participation (23.5% vs. 70.3%).\textsuperscript{17} More tellingly, in 2014, Lebanon was ranked as ‘high’ (which is negative) on OECD’s Social Institutions and Gender Index, primarily because of its discriminatory family code and the ways in which the law restricts women’s civil liberties. While Lebanese legal code does not restrict women’s movement and allows married women to apply for passports without their husbands’ permission – unlike many other countries in the region – the OECD reports that in practice the personal status codes of Lebanon’s religious sects can be more important than the law itself, with women’s daily lives shaped by their own (and their husbands’) religious affiliation and their area of residence. Of the country’s 18 recognised faiths, 15 have personal status codes that discriminate against women and all allow girls to marry as children.\textsuperscript{18} While a draft law was introduced in 2017 that would raise the minimum age of marriage to 18,\textsuperscript{19} Sunni and Shia Muslims are allowed to marry as young as nine with permission, Jews at 12 and a half, and Syrian and Armenian Orthodox Christians at 14. In no cases are boys allowed to marry before adulthood. The OECD also notes that Lebanese women have restricted access to resources and assets, again regardless of legal entitlements, and are somewhat restricted in terms of physical liberty. The first law against domestic violence was not passed until 2014 and the government is yet to collect data on sexual harassment.

### 1.1.3 The impact of the Syrian civil war on Lebanon

Lebanon has been transformed by the Syrian civil war. It is widely acknowledged to be hosting the world’s highest per capita refugee population (see Figure 2).\textsuperscript{20} Estimates of the size of the refugee population vary – from the almost 1 million registered with UNHCR\textsuperscript{21} to the government’s estimate of 2.5 million.\textsuperscript{22} Variance is due to several factors. Not only has there has been no Lebanese census for nearly a century,\textsuperscript{23} but government policy has prohibited

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**Figure 2: Refugees per capita**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of refugees per 1000 inhabitants in mid-2016</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: McCarthy, 2017*

\textsuperscript{16} UNDP, 2016.
\textsuperscript{17} UNDP, 2016b.
\textsuperscript{18} OECD, 2017.
\textsuperscript{19} Najjar, 2017.
\textsuperscript{20} Government of Lebanon and the UN, 2017; World Bank, 2016.
\textsuperscript{21} In January 2018. Figure from the Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal (http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122).
\textsuperscript{22} Daily Star Lebanon, 2017.
\textsuperscript{23} Economist, 2018.
UNHCR from officially registering any new refugees since May 2015.\textsuperscript{24} Approximations also differ, however, because growing hostility towards Syrians encourages refugees to ‘fly under the radar’ – which is comparatively easy to accomplish given that the government also prohibited UNHCR from establishing refugee camps.\textsuperscript{10} It was estimated in 2016 that one-in-three\textsuperscript{26} of the roughly 6 million\textsuperscript{27} people living in Lebanon is a refugee from the Syrian civil war. The sheer magnitude of these flows has overwhelmed Lebanon’s ability to cope, with results that have been disastrous not only for refugees themselves, but also for the most vulnerable Lebanese families.

The World Bank estimated the cost of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon’s economy at 11% in 2015.\textsuperscript{28} It also observed in 2016 that Lebanon’s total economic growth has fallen from an annual rate of 8% before the onset of the Syrian civil war to between 1-2% since,\textsuperscript{29} and that in total the country’s GDP/capita has fallen from $8,800 in 2010 to $8,000 in 2015.\textsuperscript{30} The scale of these figures, however, obscures the day-to-day costs that vulnerable Lebanese families are paying. In some areas (primarily in the north of the country near the Syrian border), rental costs have climbed over 300% as refugee families have flooded the market and limited supply in the face of increased demand has encouraged landlords to charge extortionate prices.\textsuperscript{31} Similarly, Lebanese wages in the agricultural sector fell by 29% between 2011 and 2013\textsuperscript{32} and the cost of basic food items has gone up by nearly a third.\textsuperscript{33} The World Bank calculates that up to 300,000 Lebanese workers have become unemployed due to the Syrian crisis – with nearly that many pushed into poverty.\textsuperscript{34} Watkins (2016) reports that extreme poverty in Lebanon has risen from 10% to 16% since the crisis began.

Lebanese infrastructure and public services have also been overwhelmed by demand. Public schools, for example, never recovered from the Lebanese civil war and before the Syrian conflict were only educating about one-third of Lebanese students – with the families able to pay opting for expensive but better resourced private schools instead. The public schools have been unable to make space for new arrivals that outnumber the total number of students they were already educating, even with double shifts.\textsuperscript{35} Water, sanitation and trash disposal services have been similarly strained,\textsuperscript{36} with UNICEF (2017b) noting that in the town of Aarsal wastewater has been overflowing from cesspits – leaving nearly 80,000 people at risk of disease.

The international community has belatedly recognised that the price Lebanon is paying is not tenable. In addition to stepping up logistical and financial support, the Lebanon Inter-agency Multi-Sectoral Statistical Dashboard is now tracking both the number of refugees in Lebanon and the number of Lebanese people in need of support due to the influx of refugees.\textsuperscript{37} Planning figures for 2017 estimated that of 5.9 million people living in Lebanon, 2.8 million are in need of support (see Figure 3). Of these, 1.5 million are Syrians and approximately 290,000 are Palestine refugees. The remainder, more than 1 million people, are Lebanese citizens.

1.2 Lebanon’s refugee population

There are two main groups of refugees in Lebanon: Syrians and Palestinians. While the world’s attention is largely focused on the former, which outnumber the latter by at least three to one, Lebanon has been hosting Palestine refugees since the late 1940s. It also hosts tens of thousands of ‘double refugees’ – Palestine refugees from Syria or PRS.

\textsuperscript{24} http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122.
\textsuperscript{25} This is due to fear that like camps for Palestine refugees, they may become more or less permanent. See: UNHCR, 2016.
\textsuperscript{26} Ortmans and Madsen, 2016.
\textsuperscript{27} CIA, 2017.
\textsuperscript{28} Government of Lebanon and the UN, 2017.
\textsuperscript{29} World Bank, 2017b.
\textsuperscript{30} World Bank, 2018.
\textsuperscript{31} Watkins and Zyck, 2014.
\textsuperscript{32} Mercy Corps, 2013.
\textsuperscript{33} Anera, 2014.
\textsuperscript{34} World Bank, 2016.
\textsuperscript{35} USAID, 2016; Watkins and Zyck, 2014.
\textsuperscript{36} 3rp, 2016.
\textsuperscript{37} Lebanon Inter-agency Multi-Sectoral Statistical Dashboard, 2017.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
Adolescent girls in Lebanon: The State of the Evidence

Despite its hosting history, Lebanon is signatory to neither the 1951 UN Convention nor the 1967 protocol that governs the status of refugees. While UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Lebanese government in 2003, which allowed it to register asylum seekers, this MoU does not cover refugees from Syria and the government ‘treats most Syrian refugees as illegal immigrants liable to arrest.’

1.2.1 Syrian refugees

UNHCR reports 995,512 registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon, of whom nearly 80% are women and children, and nearly 50% are school-aged. This figure is widely recognised to be an undercount and both UNHCR and government sources estimate that there are likely 1.5 million Syrians in Lebanon. As the Lebanese government, mindful of the apparent permanence of Palestine refugee camps, has refused to allow UNHCR to set up camps for Syrian refugees, these 1.5 million people are scattered in more than 2,000 communities throughout the country. Most are along the Syrian border in the country’s northern regions, already the poorest (ibid.). In some communities, refugees now outnumber Lebanese.

While the first wave of Syrian refugees was manageable, in large part because the early arrivals tended to be better-off families who had their own financial resources, more recent Syrians have arrived in Lebanon already destitute and have seen their lives grow more tenuous by the day. The policies of the Lebanese government have done much to exacerbate the situation. In addition to prohibiting UNHCR from registering more refugees, the government also introduced new residency policies in 2015. These policies mandate that refugees over the age of 15 pay a fee of $200 each in order to obtain a residency permit. HRW reported that this led to 60% of all Syrian refugees losing their official status – which restricted their movement, their ability to work and their access to education and health care (ibid.). According to UNHCR figures, only 21% of Syrian households have permits for all household members.

The impact of this policy – combined with the protracted nature of the Syrian civil war – has been devastating. The UNHCR’s (2018) annual Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees found that nearly 60% of households were living in extreme poverty, on less than $2.87 per capita per day, and 76% were living below the poverty line, on less than $3.84 per capita per day. These figures are increased from the previous year. The impact is clearest on Syrians’ food security. In 2013, just over two-thirds of Syrian refugees were considered food insecure. UNHCR’s most recent assessment found 91% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon to be food insecure – with rates for female-headed households slightly higher for those of male-headed households. Despite their destitution, it was estimated that only about one-third of Syrian refugee households were receiving a monthly cash transfer (ibid.).

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39 This is the UN treaty that defines who is a refugee and sets out refugee rights and host country responsibilities.
40 This treaty removed the geographic and temporal limitations written into the 1951 treaty above.
41 Ortmans, 2015.
42 Janmyr, 2016.
43 In January 2018. Figure from the Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal (http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122)
44 Lebanon Inter-agency Multi-Sectoral Statistical Dashboard; World Bank, 2016.
45 UNHCR, 2017.
46 UNICEF, 2017b.
47 Bartels and Hamill, 2014.
49 UNHCR, 2018.
50 Ibid.
The last year has seen mixed progress for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. On the one hand, the government agreed in February 2017 to lift the residency permit fee for many. On the other hand, the new agreement excludes the most vulnerable, the 500,000 never registered with UNHCR. Even more worrying, Lebanese President Michel Aoun has issued repeated promises to repatriate Syrians ‘as soon as possible’. Aoun, a Maronite Christian who was elected in December 2016 after the post sat vacant for over two years, used both his own inaugural speech – and U.S. President Donald Trump’s travel ban – to demand that Syrians be returned home, putatively for security reasons.

1.2.2 Palestine refugees
Lebanon has been hosting Palestine refugees since 1948. While 450,000 are registered with UNRWA, a 2017 census found that only 175,000 are currently living in Lebanon. Approximately half live in one of 12 official refugee camps, which are widely recognised as among the region’s worst, or in one of 42 more unofficial ‘gatherings’. The population, of which just over 50% is young people under the age of 25, suffers from high rates of unemployment and poverty. A 2016 survey found its poverty rate to be 65%, the food insecurity rate at 63% and the average monthly per capita spending to be under half that of Lebanese families ($195 vs. $429) – although it also noted that rates of extreme poverty have been halved since 2010. Rates of deprivation are the highest for households with children and for those living in camps. For example, 69% of Palestine refugee children between the ages of six and 14, and 74% of Palestine refugee adolescents between the ages of 15 and 19, are living in poverty. While the poverty rate for households living outside of camps is ‘only’ 55%, rates inside of camps are 71%. The survey also found that since 2010, Palestine refugee poverty had been significantly redistributed within the country, with rates climbing in the north and central regions and dropping significantly in Saida and Tyre to the south.

Palestine refugee’s high rate of poverty is driven by legal restrictions that largely derive from Lebanon’s confessionalism. Shuayb (2014) notes that while the government’s declared objective is to support refugees’ ‘right of return’ to Palestine, it is also the case that since most Palestinians are Sunni Muslims, ‘a process of naturalisation or “tawteen” would cause a dramatic demographic shift to the disadvantage of the country’s Christians’. As a result, despite a 2010 law which gave them access to some professions from which they had previously been prohibited, Palestine refugees are still forced to obtain annual work permits and are prevented from entering over 30 professions, including medicine, farming and public transportation. This almost entirely prevents them from accessing the sorts of better-paid jobs that would enable them to exit poverty, restricting most to the informal labour market and has led to very high rates of unemployment. In 2015, only 14% of Palestine refugees had an employment contract, more than 70% were in low-wage ‘elementary occupations,’ and the unemployment rate for men was over 20% (vs. 32% for women). UNHCR (2016) also reports that Palestine refugees living in Lebanon are prohibited from accessing basic government services, such as education and health care, which are provided by the UNRWA. UNRWA also provides nearly all Palestine refugee households with a quarterly cash grant.

1.2.3 Palestine refugees from Syria
PRS live even more precarious lives. Not only are they fleeing war, which leaves them with less access to personal resources even as they deal with the aftermath of trauma, but – unlike in Syria where they were treated with dignity and allowed unfettered access to work and services – in Lebanon they have faced stringent restrictions on their every move. As a result, the number of these ‘double

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52 Alabaster, 2016; Hall, 2017.
54 PCBS, 2017.
56 Chaaban et al, 2016.
57 Chaaban et al, 2016.
58 Chaaban et al, 2016.
59 Shuayb, 2014.
60 UNHCR, 2016b.
61 These include craft and related trades as well as services and sales.
63 Lebanon Inter-agency Multi-Sectoral Statistical Dashboard, 2016.
refugees’ peaked at about 41,000 (in 2014) and by the end of 2016 was down to approximately 32,000 (ibid.). In 2015, approximately 55% of PRS lived in UNRWA refugee camps, with the remainder – like their Syrian peers – scattered around other areas of the country. Unlike their Syrian peers, most are living in southern regions of the country, primarily Saida and Tyre. Most PRS households are large, consisting of nearly 6.6 members, and over half of all PRS (56%) are under the age of 25. Indeed, nearly 38% are children under the age of 15.

Largely denied access to work by the Lebanese government, evidenced by an unemployment rate of 68% for women and 49% for men, nearly all PRS live in poverty (89%) and experience food insecurity (95%). Almost 10% of PRS are extremely poor, a rate three times higher than Palestine refugees who are longer-term residents of Lebanon. Approximately two-thirds are severely food insecure and over 45% live in over-crowded conditions. Female-headed households are slightly better off than male-headed households in terms of poverty metrics. Adolescent PRS are again the most likely to be poor. Nearly 95% of those between the ages of 15 and 19 live below the poverty line and nearly 14% are extremely poor. Unsurprisingly, nearly all PRS households report relying on UNRWA assistance in order to make ends meet – with as few as 7% of families relying on labour income as a primary source of livelihood. Each PRS household is provided with a cash grant worth $100 a month. It is also given an additional $27 per month per person for food.

64 Chaaban et al., 2016.
65 Chaaban et al., 2018.
66 Chaaban et al., 2018.
67 UNRWA, 2015.
68 UNRWA, 2017b.
Adolescent girls in Lebanon

Piecing together the evidence about adolescent girls living in Lebanon is difficult. Very little is known about some capability domains – even for Lebanese girls and in a time frame that predates the Syrian crisis. For example, statistics on girls’ experiences with GBV and sexual harassment have never been collected in Lebanon, which has not prioritised gendered data.69 As an upper-middle income country, Lebanon has not participated in the Demographic and Health Surveys or, since 2009, the MICS.70,71 In other capability domains, it is difficult to separate out the experiences of different groups of girls. In some cases – such as girls’ access to voice and agency, or their experiences with social isolation – this is because their lives are likely very similar given regional culture. In other cases, their experiences are likely quite disparate but hidden in statistical amalgamation. For example, government reported educational statistics at this point include large numbers of both Lebanese and Syrian girls. It is also important to note that even individual refugee populations are very diverse. For instance, Mercy Corps (2014) reported that Syrian girls living in Saida were interested in vocational training while those living in Baalbek were not.72 That said, we now present what is known about adolescent girls’ capabilities – breaking it down by population and contextualising against adolescent boys or young adult women where possible.

2.1 Education and learning

The educational system in Lebanon is distinctive for an upper-middle income country. On the one hand, its divisions are fairly standard. They include basic education, which is for children aged six to 14 and is compulsory, and secondary education, which is for adolescents between the ages of 15 and 18 and requires passing an examination (the ‘Brevet’) in order to enrol (see Figure 4). On the other hand, Lebanese government schools educated comparatively

Figure 4: The Lebanese school system

Source: Government of Lebanon and the UN, 2017

69 The English languageCAS portal for gender statistics, for example, includes only a set of PowerPoint presentations from 2010 (see: http://www.cas.gov.lb/index.php/gender-statistics-en). Similarly, there is no page for the SDGs and the most recent gender disaggregated MDG data reported by the government is from 2007 (see: http://www.cas.gov.lb/index.php/mdg-en).
70 MICS was conducted for the Palestinian population in 2011. Notably, however, the final results have yet to be released in English. UNICEF’s website lists the ‘Final’ report only in Arabic (see: http://mics.unicef.org/surveys).
71 There have been other surveys in Lebanon, such as the 2012 National Health Statistics Report in Lebanon (see: https://gsp.hj.edu.lb/docs/recherche/recueil2en.pdf), but they do not include gender- and age-disaggregated indicators that speak to adolescent girls – outside of reporting on the Global School Health Survey results.
72 Mercy Corps, 2014.
few students (before the rapid expansion of the last few years). The public system, which never recovered from the Lebanese civil war, is almost exclusively used by the poorest and least educated families – who do not have the resources to access the large private education sector,73 which is equally split between religious and secular schools. Two-thirds of Lebanese students attend private schools,74 which not only have better infrastructure but produce significantly better academic outcomes. The educational system in Lebanon is also distinctive in that classes are taught in three different languages: Arabic, French and English. While at the primary level schools typically use Arabic and either English or French, at the secondary level, maths and science are taught exclusively in French or English.75

Learning outcomes in Lebanon are low. The 2015 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), a worldwide study by the OECD which measures the performance of 15-year-old students on mathematics, science and reading, found Lebanese students’ scores significantly below the average.76 The average science score was only 386 (vs. an OECD average of 493), the average reading score 347 (vs. an average of 493) and the average maths score 396 (vs. an average of 490). Perhaps more tellingly, only 2.5% of Lebanese students scored in the top two of PISA’s six categories – and over half of all adolescents scored below the line that is considered baseline proficient.77

As noted above, Syria’s crisis has stretched Lebanese public schools well past the breaking point. The government is allowing Syrian children to attend for free, even covering the price of books – which it has not historically done for its own students – and, with the help of international donors is now running second shift classes in an attempt to create space for the hundreds of thousands of children who need an education. But it cannot keep up.79 Not only are many Syrian children still out of school, but the quality of education in Lebanese public schools has fallen as classrooms have become overcrowded.80 Given funding shortfalls, estimated by HRW (2017b) to be $97 million – out of a total need of $350 million – future progress appears deeply uncertain.

2.1.1 Lebanese girls

Even before the Syrian crisis, primary education in Lebanon was not quite universal. In 2011, the primary net enrolment rate for girls was only 88% (vs. 95% for boys). In 2013, 94% of girls reached the last year of primary school (vs. 87% of boys).81 Figure 5 on the following page shows the differences between Lebanese and Syrian students (as the 2015 government figures included both) and highlights the relevant statistics, by sex, for both 2011 (before the Syrian crisis) and 2015.82 Note that while gender parity has been achieved at the secondary level, because girls are more likely to complete primary school than boys, at the primary level boys remain more likely to enrol than girls. Youth literacy, for both girls and boys, is universal.

While Lebanese adolescent girls are just as likely as their brothers to attend secondary school – and are in fact more likely to attend university (46% vs. 40% in 201483) – they are still largely shunted into ‘girl’ subjects. At the secondary level, for example, they are five times more likely than boys to study arts and the humanities and well under half as likely to study general science.84 At the university level, over 90% of those studying education and 70% of those studying health and welfare are female.85 Conversely, 70% of those studying engineering are male.

PISA scores reflect this gendered placement. While girls’ and boys’ science scores are similar, girls outscore

74 Shacktle, 2017.
75 USAID, 2016; World Education News and Reviews, 2017.
76 OECD, 2016.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
82 Most recent data available at the time of drafting.
84 El Jouni and Fong, 2010.
85 Yaacoub and Badre, 2012.
boys on reading (353 vs. 339) and boys outscore girls on maths (408 vs. 386).\textsuperscript{65} Unsurprisingly, recent evidence suggests that it is not a lack of aptitude that holds Lebanese girls back in mathematics.\textsuperscript{67} Research with adolescent girls and boys between the ages of 12 and 16 found no differences in their mathematics achievement or in their attitudes towards maths. On the other hand, it found striking differences in teachers’ explanations of girls’ versus boys’ success. Teachers attributed boys’ success to their ability – and their failure to a lack of motivation. They attributed girls’ success to their motivation – and their failure to a lack of ability.\textsuperscript{68}

2.1.2 Syrian girls
The most recent Vulnerability Assessment found marked progress in getting Syrian girls – and boys – into school. In 2017, 70% of children aged 6 to 14 were enrolled in school, compared to only 52% in 2016.\textsuperscript{69} That said, progress was overwhelmingly concentrated in younger children and earlier grades. Over half of children who were enrolled in primary school were over-age, with the end result that the net attendance ratio was only 13% for lower secondary school and 5% for upper secondary school. Older adolescents are quite unlikely to attend school, even in Beirut (see Figure 6).

Completion rates, which show a slightly different perspective than enrolment rates, are also low. Only 12% of Syrian refugee children have ultimately completed primary school (see Figure 7).

Notably, while Syrian refugee boys are slightly more likely to enrol in primary school than girls, by lower secondary school, enrolment is tilted heavily in girls’ favour (see Figure 8).

A growing number of studies have found that the reasons for Syrian girls’ non-attendance converge around the same themes – and centre on cost and lack of space (see Figure 9).\textsuperscript{70} While the Lebanese government has waived tuition fees and is providing books free of charge to Syrian students (with the support of international donors), transportation costs are prohibitive given that more than nine-in-10 Syrian families live below the poverty line. Furthermore, while second shift schools are being scaled up every year, the Lebanese public school system remains unable to accommodate the sheer number of Syrian children in need of education.

Syrian adolescent girls are also prevented from attending school for a variety of reasons other than cost.

\textsuperscript{65} OECD, 2017b.
\textsuperscript{66} Sarouphim and Chartouny, 2017.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} UNHCR 2018.
\textsuperscript{69} UNICEF et al., 2016; Shuayb et al., 2016; Foster, 2015; Sirin and Sirin-Rogers, 2015; Watkins and Zyck, 2014; UNFPA et al., 2014; Charles and Denman, 2013; El Masri et al., 2013.
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Figure 6: School enrolment by age group and governorate

Source: UNHCR et al., 2018

Figure 7: Education completion rate by school level and governorate

Source: UNHCR et al., 2018

Figure 8: Gender parity index by school level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Parity Index</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Secondary</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Secondary</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR, 2018
and space.\(^91\) HRW (2016) found that despite efforts by the national government, many refugee families are still being asked to provide documentation that they do not have (e.g. proof of residency or UNHCR papers), which means that they are unable to enrol their children. At the secondary level, differences between the Syrian and Lebanese curriculum feature heavily – especially given that in Syria classes are taught exclusively in Arabic and in Lebanon maths and science classes are taught in English or French. Secondary school attendance is further hampered by the fact that students can not enrol until they have passed the Brevet exam given at the end of primary school. Many Syrian children are not prepared for this given that the afternoon school sessions that they attend often teach to a level three grades below morning sessions.\(^92,93\) Other reasons commonly given for Syrian girls’ non-attendance include violence and sexual harassment en route to school, and the fact that Lebanese schools are mixed-sex. Syrian schools typically catered to either girls or boys but rarely both.\(^94\) Syrian boys are more likely than Syrian girls to be out of school because they must work (34% vs. 6%),\(^95\) and about 7% of Syrian girls between the ages of 15 and 17 reported being out of school due to marriage.\(^96\) Interestingly, Syrian girls are significantly more likely than Syrian boys to have their tuition fees paid by local or international NGOs (53% vs. 43%), while boys’ fees are more likely to be paid by parents (48% vs. 37%).\(^97\)

While some research has found that Syrian children are reluctant to go to school because of the hostility they face from Lebanese students,\(^98\) with up to 40% of children admitting that they would rather stay home because they do not feel safe at school,\(^99\) other research has not found this to be true. In-school adolescents in a 2013 survey were in fact far more likely than their out-of-school peers to report friendships with Lebanese students (67% vs. 30%).\(^100\)

### 2.1.3 Palestine refugee girls

UNRWA educates Palestine refugee children living in Lebanon because the Lebanese government has made it difficult for Palestine refugee families to use government schools and few can afford private schools.\(^101\) In 2015, enrolment rates among longer-term refugee children were

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\(^{91}\) DeJong et al., 2017; Shuayb et al., 2016; Sirin and Sirin-Rogers, 2015; Watkins and Zycz, 2014; UNFPA et al., 2014; Charles and Denman, 2013; El Masri et al., 2013.

\(^{92}\) Teachers in Shuayb et al.’s (2016) study reported that this was meant to help support Syrian students’ learning and reduce repetition.

\(^{93}\) Shuayb et al., 2016.

\(^{94}\) El Masri et al., 2013.

\(^{95}\) UNFPA et al., 2014; Shuayb et al., 2016.

\(^{96}\) UNHCR et al., 2016, see also Shuayb et al., 2016.

\(^{97}\) UNFPA et al., 2014.

\(^{98}\) Sirin and Sirin-Rogers, 2015.

\(^{99}\) Shuayb et al., 2016.

\(^{100}\) UNFPA et al., 2014.

\(^{101}\) Shuayb, 2014.
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97% at the primary level, 84% at the preparatory level and 61% at the secondary level – the last up from only 51% in 2010. While at the primary level girls and boys were equally likely to be enrolled in school, at the preparatory level girls begin to significantly outnumber boys. Nationally, nearly 90% of girls and only 79% of boys were enrolled in preparatory school. At the secondary level, 65% of girls and only 58% of boys are enrolled (see Figure 10). Boys are more likely to leave school than girls because they are doing poorly (20.8% vs. 10.1%), because they do not like school (17% vs. 8.8%) and because they must work (10.6% vs. 1.9%). On the other hand, girls are more likely to leave school than boys due to child marriage (6.8% vs. <1%).

Unsurprisingly, girls from wealthier families had better academic outcomes. Of those aged 15 to 24, 99% of those in the top two income quintiles were literate, compared to 91% of those in the bottom three quintiles.

Shuayb (2014) notes that while enrolment rates are going up for Palestine refugee children, academic outcomes are actually declining – as more students are being forced to share a static amount of resources. UNRWA schools ‘lack quality teaching, teaching resources and basic laboratories – all that can promote engaged and active learning and critical thinking among students’. As a result, Brevet pass rates, which averaged 43% in the 2009/10 school year, were down to as low as 13.6% in some UNRWA schools in 2012/13. Declining academic outcomes among Palestine refugee children are particularly fraught given that Afifi et al. (2016) found that a university education is seen by Palestine refugee parents and adolescents as the only way to secure a better future. They note that while few refugees achieve this goal (5%), parents place a strong emphasis on their children’s schooling – sometimes to the detriment of their children’s mental health (discussed below).

Despite their poverty, compared to Syrian children, PRS are comparatively more likely to go to school – because they have access to UNRWA schools (less than 4% go to public schools). Adolescent girls are far more likely than their male peers to be in school. At the primary level, 89.6% of girls and 87% of boys are enrolled. At the preparatory level, 75.2% of girls and 64.3% of boys are enrolled. At the secondary level, 42.9% of girls and 28.4% of boys are enrolled. UNRWA (2015) reports that the main reasons that PRS children are out of school are war and emigration, with school failure, low school attachment and poverty-related reasons also important (see Figure 11). Chaaban et al. (2016) adds that a large number of PRS students drop out during preparatory school, but before they take the Brevet – which may be due to the fact that PRS students, like Syrian students, struggle with the language of instruction or face difficulty in getting the official Brevet certificate because of their irregular legal status.

Figure 10: School enrolment, by level and sex, of longer-term Palestine refugees

![Enrolment Rates](image)

Source: Chaahan et al., 2016

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102 Chaaban et al., 2016.
103 Chaaban et al., 2016.
104 Chaaban et al., 2016.
105 Chaaban et al., 2016.
2.2 Bodily integrity and freedom from violence

It is also difficult to ascertain the type and magnitude of threats facing adolescent girls’ bodily integrity. In addition to the fact that there is no common minimum age for marriage across the country, because different religious communities have their own personal status laws,\(^\text{106}\) there appears to be no national level research that has focused on GBV. Attention does, however, slowly appear to be growing. In addition to the law criminalising domestic violence, passed in 2014, in December 2016 the parliamentary committee in charge of justice agreed to abolish the law that allowed rapists to avoid prosecution by marrying their victims.\(^\text{107}\)

2.2.1 Lebanese girls

As ESCWA (2015) notes, despite Lebanon's history of conflict, child marriage is rare among native Lebanese. Indeed, as early as 1975, Lebanon had the highest age of first marriage for women of all MENA countries (23.2 years).\(^\text{108}\) Today, according to UNICEF, 1% of adolescent girls living in Lebanon marry before the age of 15, and 6% before the age of 18.\(^\text{109}\) These figures unfortunately include both Lebanese girls and Palestine refugee girls. Research with older women has found markedly different rates of child marriage in different communities.\(^\text{110}\) For example, 16% of Alawi women but only 6% of Greek Catholic women married as children. Rates for Sunni and Shia women were 13% and 12% respectively.

The only research that appears to have addressed the prevalence of violence against women (VAW) in Lebanon is the Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa survey (SWMENA), which was conducted by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems and the Institute for Women’s Policy Research in 2009. That survey included only adults, but was designed to be proportionally representative of Lebanon’s regions and religions.\(^\text{111}\) SWMENA Lebanon\(^\text{112}\) found that while 84% of women felt completely free to move around public areas without fear, 35% reported that men made rude, vulgar and harassing noises and gestures at them most or every time they ventured into public. Only 4% of women said that they had never been harassed. Physical contact was far rarer – only one in five women reported being touched against her will in public.

The same study found that Lebanese women and men overwhelmingly reject the idea that husbands ever have the right to beat their wives. About 12% of women with less than a primary education – and only 2% of women with a secondary education – report that beating is ever acceptable (by way of contrast, in Jordan the 2012 DHS found that about 70% of women aged 15-49 believed that a man could be justified in beating his wife for at least one given reason).\(^\text{113}\) For men, rates are about 10% regardless of education level. Overall, 93% of adult women reported that

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\(^{107}\) Ibid.

\(^{108}\) Ibid.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.

\(^{110}\) Université Saint-Joseph, 2015.


\(^{112}\) IFES and IWPR, 2010c.

domestic violence was ‘completely rejected’ by their own community. Rates were highest among Christian women, 97% of whom reported complete rejection. When asked to identify why domestic violence might occur, women and men agreed that the primary reason was stress in men’s lives (38% of women and 30% of men). The second reason given, however, was that ‘the wife must have done something wrong’ (23% of women and 27% of men).

SWMENA also found that large majorities of adult women and men in Lebanon support changing the penal code, in order to prosecute ‘honour crimes’. Overall, 86% of women and 74% of men are in favour of change. Alarmingly, the youngest Lebanese are the least likely to favour legal change. Only 83% of women aged 18 to 34 support change (compared to 88% of older women). Only 70% of the youngest men report the same (compared to 86% of older men).

2.2.2 Refugee girls
In the case of threats to their bodily integrity, refugee girls – regardless of whether they are Syrians or Palestine refugees fleeing from Syria – have much in common. While we will attempt to disaggregate between populations where possible, it should be noted that research has broadly found that child marriage appears to be increasing, as families simultaneously try to reduce their financial demands by transferring the daily costs of girls to marital households, ensure their physical safety and protect family honour. It has also found that violence against women and girls (VAWG) is exploding as men experience ever growing threats to their masculinity, and that some refugee girls and women are being forced into survival sex.

2.2.3 Syrian girls
While child marriage was common in Syria even before the war, with 10% of girls aged 15 to 19 already married according to the 2006 MICS (and 13% of women aged 20 to 24 married before the age of 18), evidence suggests that rates of child marriage in the Syrian refugee population are significantly higher. The most recent UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment reports that 22% of girls aged 15 to 19 are already married, one-fifth to men 10 years their elder. A survey by UNFPA, the American University in Beirut and Sawa found that of women aged 20 to 24 living in Western Bekaa, over a third were married before the age of 18. It also found that 24% of Syrian girls between the ages of 15 and 17 were already married. Another study found that 18% of Syrian girls between the ages of 15 and 18 were married, compared to only 2% of boys the same age, at an average age of only 17.1 years. While it is likely that some of the difference in child marriage rates is due to the fact that the refugee population is different from the pre-war Syrian population, ‘various indications suggest that displacement conditions have played a major role in lowering the age of marriage and speeding up the marriage process’.

The reasons for child marriage, like the reasons for school leaving, cluster around a few key themes – the largest of which is again poverty (see Figure 12). Given that the financial resources of Syrian families are so limited, some families see child marriage as a way to effectively ‘buy’ a better future for their daughters, especially when they can marry them to Lebanese men of better means. There is anecdotal evidence of Syrian girls being offered

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114 IFES and IWPR, 2010d.
115 Mourtada et al., 2017; De Jong et al., 2017; ESCWA, 2015; Charles and Denman, 2013; IRC, 2014; UNFPA et. al., 2014; Anani, 2013; El Masri et al., 2013; Bartels and Hamill, 2014; Save the Children, 2014; Anera, 2014.
117 UNHCR, 2018.
118 UNFPA, 2017.
119 UNFPA et. al., 2014.
120 ESCWA, 2015: 55.
121 Bartels, 2016; Bartels and Hamill, 2014.
122 Mourtada et al., 2017; Bartels, 2016; UNFPA et. al., 2014.

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Figure 12: What’s driving child marriage in Lebanon?

The events in the story happened mostly because of...
in marriage to Lebanese men in exchange for payments of 3,000,000 LBP (about $2,000). Some girls find themselves wanting to marry as children, in order to relieve their families of the burden of feeding them, especially when there are concerns that not all members of the family can be fed equally. Syrian refugee families also marry their daughters as children in order to keep them physically safe, particularly when they have concerns that they themselves will not live long enough to see them to adulthood, or to protect their honour in the event that they are raped. For refugee girls from more rural areas of Syria, community expectations continue to drive child marriage.

In addition to facing a growing risk of child marriage, Syrian adolescent girls must also contend with sexual harassment and GBV, including rape. UNFPA et al. (2014) found that of girls aged 15 to 18, 59% had ‘never once’ felt safe while living in Lebanon (compared to 50% of boys the same age). About one-fifth felt unsafe when moving around their residential units (22%), when using the toilet at night (19%) and while sleeping (17%) (ibid.). Girls living in the northern areas near the Syrian border were particularly likely to feel unsafe. Girls also reported that sexual harassment was common, with aid workers, Lebanese and Syrian coordinators, employers and public transport drivers the most likely to harass them. Critically, while earlier, more non-specific surveys suggested that Syrian girls were at increased risk of being forced into survival sex, UNFPA et al.’s (2014) survey concluded that such claims were ‘hugely exaggerated’. Only 4% of surveyed young people admitted to having heard of a Syrian refugee who had offered sexual services in exchange for money and all of those accounts were second-hand. Exaggerated claims, note UNFPA et al. (2014) ‘contribute to making females even more vulnerable by directing attention away from the more prevalent types of violence and abuse female refugees are exposed to.’

Syrian girls are also increasingly vulnerable to violence at home, as their parents become more and more fragile due to the stress of poverty and war, and they find themselves more likely to be married to older men who abuse them. Of girls 15 to 18, 63% think family tensions have increased since moving to Lebanon (compared to 55% of boys). Markedly, adolescent girls are much more likely than adolescent boys or young adult women to believe that men’s and women’s violence towards their children is acceptable, given stress levels (see Figure 13). One-third of girls aged 15 to 18 believe that violence towards children

Figure 13: The acceptability of familial violence, by age and sex

Percentage of youth in agreement with the following statements:

| Under the prevailing difficult psychological conditions, a woman’s usage of violence against members of her family could be acceptable |
|---|---|---|
| Female 15-18 | Female 19-24 | Male 15-19 | Male 19-24 |
| 32 | 11 | 25 | 17 |

| Under the prevailing difficult psychological conditions, a man’s usage of violence against members of his family could be acceptable |
|---|---|---|
| Female 15-18 | Female 19-24 | Male 15-19 | Male 19-24 |
| 33 | 18 | 25 | 17 |

Source: UNFPA et al., 2014

123 CARE, 2015.
125 Mourtada et al., 2017; DeJong et al., 2017; UNFPA et al., 2014; Bartels, 2016; Save the Children, 2014; El Masri et al., 2013.
126 See also Bartels and Hamill, 2014.
127 UNFPA et al., 2014.
128 IRC, 2014; Charles and Denman, 2013.
129 UNFPA et al., 2014: 141.
130 UNFPA et al., 2014.
131 Anani, 2013.
is OK if parents are stressed.\textsuperscript{132} We were unable to locate any incidence statistics about intimate partner violence for adolescent refugee girls.

### 2.2.4 Palestine refugee girls

Evidence about threats to Palestine refugee girls' bodily integrity is almost absent – though a youth assessment recently commissioned by UNICEF may begin to help us understand girls' lives and needs.\textsuperscript{133} The 2011 MICS found that of Lebanon’s longer-term Palestine refugee women, 19% of those between the ages of 20 and 49 were married before the age of 18. UNRWA (2016) estimates, based on the referral systems that it has in place, that the incidence of forced marriage in Lebanon is only 2% (compared to 1.4% in Jordan and 1% in the West Bank).\textsuperscript{134}

Rates of forced marriage among the PRS population are estimated to be far higher, at 14%.\textsuperscript{135} Rates of child marriage appear untracked, but UNRWA (2015) reported that 12.2% of pregnant or breastfeeding PRS women are under the age of 20.\textsuperscript{136}

### 2.3 Physical health and nutrition

Evidence indicates that threats to Lebanese girls' physical health largely revolve around poor nutrition, in the context of a growing epidemic of obesity and substance abuse. Syrian girls, on the other hand, are at high risk of malnutrition and adolescent pregnancy. We know almost nothing about the physical health of Palestine refugee girls living in Lebanon.

#### 2.3.1 Lebanese girls

Evidence about Lebanese girls' physical health is thin and fractured, with much of the research found in academic sources failing to disaggregate between adolescent girls and boys. Much of what we know comes from the 2011 Global school-based student health survey.\textsuperscript{137} Because that survey reported results separately for public and private schools, and because typically only the poorest children attend public schools, we are able to make rough inferences about the different health risks faced by different populations of girls. (Some results are covered here under physical health, others will be discussed below under psychosocial wellbeing.)

Lebanese girls are quite unlikely to become mothers as adolescents. In 2015, the adolescent fertility rate was only 12/1000, compared to 23/1000 in Jordan and 38/1000 in the MENA region.\textsuperscript{138} Low rates are driven by the reality that unmarried Lebanese girls are unlikely to be sexually active, due to strong social norms that stigmatise girls’ sexuality and see their virginity as a sign of family honour.\textsuperscript{139} Indeed, while Lebanon is slowly and unevenly moving forward in implementing a national sexuality education curriculum in all public schools,\textsuperscript{140} with the aim of reducing HIV, Bteich et al. (2017) observe that ‘premarital sex is still considered borderline and illegal at the official level’ with Lebanese legal code stating that it is ‘contrary to nature’.\textsuperscript{141} Unsurprisingly, university students report little open communication about sexuality at home or at school\textsuperscript{142} and limited knowledge of contraception.\textsuperscript{143} Another study found that female university students were especially unlikely to have ever had sex.\textsuperscript{144}

There has been little research on Lebanese adolescent girls’ experiences of puberty.\textsuperscript{145} While research has found that the age of menarche is declining, echoing global patterns, only one study appears to have focused on girls’ menstrual experiences. It found that of girls aged 13 to 19, 41% were sometimes absent from school because of their periods and nearly 75% had some symptoms of dysmenorrhoea.\textsuperscript{146} It also found that only about 7% of girls had consulted a physician about menstrual symptoms.

\textsuperscript{132} UNFPA et al., 2014.
\textsuperscript{133} RedR Australia, 2017.
\textsuperscript{134} UNRWA, 2016.
\textsuperscript{135} UNRWA, 2016.
\textsuperscript{136} UNRWA, 2015.
\textsuperscript{137} WHO, 2011a,b,c.
\textsuperscript{138} World Bank, 2018.
\textsuperscript{139} Bteich et al., 2017; Salameh et al., 2016.
\textsuperscript{140} Kouyoumiyan et al. 201; Mouhanna et al., 2017.
\textsuperscript{141} Bteich et al., 2017: 34.
\textsuperscript{142} Bteich et al., 2017.
\textsuperscript{143} World Bank, 2018.
\textsuperscript{144} Bteich et al., 2017; Salameh et al., 2016.
\textsuperscript{145} This topic was not covered in the 2011 Global School Health Survey. A report on the 2016 survey is not yet online.
\textsuperscript{146} Santina et al., 2012.
Two studies have touched on adolescents’ desire for reproductive health education (RHE) and both found that older students are more likely to want school-based RHE than younger students.\(^{147}\) In addition, Mouhanna et al. (2017), using data from the 2011 Global School Health Survey, found that students who support RHE are more likely to have consumed alcohol, to prefer mixed-sex classes for RHE, to believe that RHE should start at or before puberty, and to have ever received RHE in school. Noting that their bivariate findings differed from final multivariate models, they also call for more research on girls’ versus boys’ and better-off versus less-well-off young peoples’ desire for RHE.

Another study, with students in 7th through 9th grades, found that those who had knowledge about risky sexual behaviours were the most likely to believe that they would be able to refuse sex – again suggesting that school-based education should be scaled more rapidly. Overall, about 35% of girls and 60% of boys were not confident that they would be able to tell someone that they did not want to have sex.\(^{148}\)

While focused on improving neonatal health outcomes, rather than girls’ own health outcomes, there has been one study that suggests that school-based education improves girls’ knowledge about pre-conception health.\(^{149}\) That study, which included Lebanese girls in 10th through 12th grades, found that a single 30-minute session improved girls’ knowledge by about 50%.

There are several recent studies focused on girls’ nutrition – unsurprising given that adolescent girls appear to be increasingly likely to be overweight and obese. One study found that the mean weight of girls aged 10 to 19 went up from 50.14 kg to 57.23 kg between 1997 and 2009, with a much smaller increase in height.\(^{150}\) This increase appears related to the fact that adolescents are eating less healthy food while getting less physical exercise,\(^{151}\) and is especially interesting because Lebanese boys aged 13 to 15 are actually more than twice as likely to be overweight than Lebanese girls (total rates of 14.1% vs. 34%)\(^{152}\) (see Figure 14). They are, on the other hand, also more likely to be physically active.

High socio-economic status adolescents (aged 17 to 19) have been found to have better knowledge about nutrition and also to have more diverse diets that include more protein and micronutrients.\(^{153}\) WHO’s Global school-based student health survey (2011a,b,c) found that this is paying off in terms of students’ weight.\(^{154}\) Both girls and boys attending private schools were less likely to be overweight than those attending public schools (see Figure 14). On the other hand, those attending public schools were more likely to be physically active – perhaps because they contributed more to household work or perhaps because they had less ‘screen time’ (see Box 2).

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**Figure 14: Proportion of students overweight and physically active, by sex and school type**

Source: WHO, 2011a,b,c

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147 Mouhanna et al., 2017; La Sagesse University, 2011.
148 Kouyoumijian et al., 2012.
149 Charafeddine et al., 2014.
150 Nasreddine et al., 2012.
151 Naja et al., 2015
152 WHO, 2011a,b,c.
153 Nabhani-Zeidan et al., 2011.
154 WHO, 2011a,b,c.
Adolescent girls in Lebanon: The State of the Evidence

Better-off girls (and boys) who attend private schools are also far more likely to consume alcohol and to have been ‘really drunk’ (see Figure 15). While 13- to 15-year-old boys are overall more at risk than girls for having consumed alcohol at least once in the last month (36.5% vs. 21.6%) and for having been ‘really drunk’ at least once (27.1% vs. 16%), gender differences pale in comparison to private and public school populations. Fares et al. (2015) add that gender differences in alcohol consumption are in fact shrinking over time. Between the 2005 and 2011 rounds of the Global school-based student health survey, girls’ alcohol use went up 122% – with girls reporting that their main source of alcohol was not ‘stores’ or ‘friends’, which is where boys reported getting their alcohol, but from their ‘family’. This is particularly interesting in light of an older study, which found that adolescent girls and boys were equally likely to smoke waterpipes (about 26%), perhaps because doing so expressed liberation and gender equality, and that their parents were overall permissive.\(^{155}\)

Figure 15: Alcohol use, by sex and school type

Source: WHO, 2011a,b,c

Box 2: Lebanese adolescents and the internet

Unsurprisingly, as Lebanon is a relatively well-off and well-connected country, adolescents’ ICT use is high. On average, Lebanese teens use the internet for nearly three hours a day. A small study conducted in 2017 found that over 90% of adolescents and young adults use a mobile phone to access the internet, and over 50% use either a shared or personal computer.\(^{1}\) Earlier work found some gender differences in how adolescents use the internet, with girls primarily using it for communication (87%) and research (67%) and boys using it for communication (78%) and entertainment (63%).\(^{2}\) More recent research suggests, however, that girls and boys use the same sites: Instagram (69%), Snapchat (63%), Facebook (62%) and YouTube (51%).\(^{3}\)

Few adolescents in Lebanon appear to have an adult monitoring their online lives. Hawi (2012) found that about 40% of all adolescents are at least moderately addicted to the internet, with younger adolescents and boys the most likely to use it excessively. SMEX (2017) reports that 40% are allowed on any site they want and that nearly half (47%) have parental rules that are not actively enforced. Less than 15% of adolescents report active parental control of their intent usage. This is worrying given that many adolescents appear to divulge personal information. For example, 86% use their real name, 40% share their home address and 33% share their phone number.\(^{4}\)

Girls are more likely than boys to be worried about their online privacy – a concern that appears to pay off for them in terms of how safely they behave when online.\(^{5}\) Boys are more likely than girls to receive offensive pictures (27% vs. 13%), to have their social media account hacked (26% vs. 15%) and to have been threatened with violence (16% vs. 7%).\(^{6}\)

Better-off girls (and boys) who attend private schools are also far more likely to consume alcohol and to have been ‘really drunk’ (see Figure 15). While 13- to 15-year-old boys are overall more at risk than girls for having consumed alcohol at least once in the last month (36.5% vs. 21.6%) and for having been ‘really drunk’ at least once (27.1% vs. 16%), gender differences pale in comparison to private and public school populations. Fares et al. (2015) add that gender differences in alcohol consumption are in fact shrinking over time. Between the 2005 and 2011 rounds of the Global school-based student health survey, girls’ alcohol use went up 122% – with girls reporting that their main source of alcohol was not ‘stores’ or ‘friends’, which is where boys reported getting their alcohol, but from their ‘family’. This is particularly interesting in light of an older study, which found that adolescent girls and boys were equally likely to smoke waterpipes (about 26%), perhaps because doing so expressed liberation and gender equality, and that their parents were overall permissive.\(^{155}\)

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\(^{1}\) Hawi, 2012

\(^{2}\) SMEX, 2017

\(^{3}\) Hawi, 2012

\(^{4}\) SMEX, 2017

\(^{5}\) SMEX, 2017

\(^{6}\) Ibid.

\(^{i}\) Hawi, 2012

\(^{ii}\) SMEX, 2017

\(^{iii}\) Hawi, 2012

\(^{iv}\) SMEX, 2017

\(^{v}\) Ibid.

\(^{vi}\) Ibid.

\(^{vii}\) Ibid.

\(^{155}\) Tamim et al, 2007
Particular parenting practices have been found to reduce Lebanese adolescents’ odds of substance use. A 2011 survey of female and male high school students in Beirut found that those whose parents regulated their media use – even a little – were less likely to consume alcohol. Those whose parents were involved in their school work were less likely to use a waterpipe. Those whose parents monitored their friends and whereabouts, and involved them in decision-making, were less likely to use any sort of illegal substances.

2.3.2 Syrian girls

Evidence on Syrian girls’ physical health also revolves around nutrition and SRH. However, given that international organisations have conducted several needs assessments in order to plan programming for Syrian refugees – comparatively more is known about the latter.

In terms of nutrition, the main headline for Syrian girls is not their growing rate of obesity, but their overwhelming risk of food insecurity. Only 44% of Syrian children eat more than two meals a day, regardless of whether their families are receiving a cash transfer, and 70% of Syrian girls aged 15 to 18 report eating fewer meals each day since arriving in Lebanon (compared to 64% of boys the same age).

Young people in Anera’s (2014) assessment reported that in addition to skipping meals, they also relied on neighbours’ generosity and compromised on food quality.

Syrian girls’ knowledge about contraception is low. Driven by taboos surrounding pre-marital sex and a continuing cultural preference for large families, two-thirds of Syrian girls between the ages of 15 and 18 report having no knowledge about contraception (see Figure 16). Indeed, over one-quarter of young women between the ages of 18 and 24 also report having no knowledge. Furthermore, even among Syrian refugees who have already begun childbearing and prefer to have no more children, more than 40% are using no contraception, almost exclusively for demand-side reasons such as believing in fate, believing that their religion prohibits it or because their spouses do not approve. Only 10% of Syrian refugee youth report that lack of knowledge or access is a barrier to contraceptive uptake.

Figure 16: Attitudes of Syrian young people towards childbearing, by age and sex

Percentage of youth in agreement with the following statements:

- Men want women to have children during crisis to keep the family name when they are dead
- It is important to have children under these circumstances since we are losing many people in wars
- It is necessary to provide safe medical services to pregnant women who need to undertake abortion
- We should never use contraceptives, even if we have no desire to have children at the time

Source: UNFPA et al, 2014

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158 Ghandour et al, 2017
157 Foster, 2015
158 UNFPA et al, 2014
169 Ibid.
That said, very few Syrian young people have access to information about SRH, with qualitative work finding that adolescents even lack basic information about puberty. Indeed, one survey found that less than half of Syrian young people reported that they had ever had someone discuss SRH with them; 41% of girls and only 30% of boys between the ages of 15 and 24 had ever had a conversation about SRH. For girls aged 15 to 18, 58% of those who had had a conversation had it with a parent (vs. 29% of boys). Boys were more likely to have had a conversation with a friend (28% for boys vs. 10% for girls). These figures require caution, however. Syrian young people were so uncomfortable with the notion of sexuality – not surprising given that 90% report that sex outside of marriage is not acceptable – that more than one-fifth either reported that they had no questions or were not interested.

While Syrian boys are quite likely to smoke (24% said yes to cigarettes) and drink (19%), Syrian girls are unlikely to do either (1% and 6% respectively).

While Syrian refugees are overall likely to attend antenatal care (about 70%), less than one third of Syrian young people have attended a health clinic for a reason other than SRH care. About two-thirds of both girls and boys between the ages of 15 and 18 say that health care is simply not affordable for them. Another quarter report that care is poor quality and a fifth that they are treated poorly by medical staff (ibid.).

2.3.3 Palestine refugee girls

While research aimed at the broader Palestine refugee population has included modules on both ill health and disability, there has apparently been no disaggregation that permits exploring the experiences of adolescent girls – or even the broader categories of adolescents or young women. Hopefully UNICEF’s upcoming youth assessment will begin to address this gap.

The 2011 MICS reports the adolescent birth rate among Palestine refugees at 32 per 1000. An earlier study found that of adolescents between the ages of 13 and 15, 16.6% of boys and 5.6% of girls smoke.

Even less is known about Lebanon’s PRS population. As noted above, over 12% of pregnant and breastfeeding PRS women are under the age of 20. Furthermore, only 5.6% of PRS households are food secure.

2.4 Psychosocial wellbeing

Mercy Corps’ (2014) assessment of adolescent girls in Lebanon, which was echoed by Anera (2014), found that girls were ‘staggeringly’ likely to be isolated and nearly universally wanted to have a shared space of their own. However, across the country, not only are girls, particularly refugee girls, likely to remain physically and socially cut off from social opportunities which are vital to their wellbeing, they also have little access to any form of mental health services. Ayyash-Abdo et al. (2016) notes that Lebanon directs only a fraction of its health care budget to mental health (6%), largely for adults, and that schools do not even have psychologists or counsellors, despite evidence that up to 35% of in-school adolescents are suffering from PTSD.

2.4.1 Lebanese girls

Like their peers in other countries, Lebanese girls appear to be vulnerable to depression and anxiety. A sample of over 500 adolescents aged 11 to 17 found that the 30-day prevalence of psychiatric disorders was over 26% – with anxiety being the most common (13%). Girls were more likely than boys to have emotional disorders, while boys were more likely to ‘externalising’ disorders such as ADHD. Very few children (6%) sought professional help. These findings were echoed by Ayyash-Abdo and colleagues (2016), whose survey of 650 adolescents ranging in age from 10 to 18 found that girls were more likely than boys to have depressive and somatic complaints. This is likely because they are ‘generally expected to be more subdued and acquiescent than boys, as it is in a heavily patriarchal society’, albeit far less so than other countries in the MENA region. These
findings were also reflected in the 2011 Global school-based student health survey, which found that girls aged 13 to 15 were more likely than boys of the same age to have thought about suicide at least once in the last month (see Figure 17). Girls attending public schools, who are likely to be lower income, were especially likely to have thought about suicide – perhaps because their families are under more stress or perhaps because they were less likely to believe that their parents understood their problems and worries. Boys, on the other hand, were far more likely to be bullied than girls.

Search for Common Ground’s 2014 survey of young people between the ages of 15 and 25 found that girls feel deeply constrained by social norms and – unlike their male peers – generally dislike their communities. Girls and young women reported that being female adds multiple constraints to their daily lives and they constantly worried about ‘how they are perceived and accepted by their communities.’

Other potentially relevant research on psychosocial wellbeing that has included Lebanese girls has found that more religious Lebanese adolescents tend to be happier, and that ‘distrust and social fragmentation were generally prevalent among adolescents living in impoverished suburban communities’ – especially those with more heterogeneous populations. Research with Lebanese Arab university students has also found that while Arab parents tend to favour ‘absolute submission’ to parental authority, because that parenting style is accompanied by warmth and caring, it does not appear to disrupt the close ties young people have with their parents (Rasmi et al., 2012).

2.4.2 Syrian girls

Syrian girls’ psychosocial wellbeing is under a continual assault which research has found derails ‘normal development’ and rewrites the brain’s neural pathways. They have fled war, violence and death. They are coping with poverty and overcrowding that violates norms that require that they remain out of sight from boys and men who are not close relatives. They are facing increasing hostility from host communities. And they are largely confined to home to stifle their feelings by themselves.

UNFPA et al.’s (2014) survey of Syrian youth found that only 5% of adolescent girls between the ages of 15 and 18 are satisfied with their lives. Only 1% are happy. More than one in five are anxious and more than two in five are depressed. Nearly 60% admitted to having thought about suicide at least once (compared to 27% of boys the same age) – a rate far higher than their Lebanese peers. Nearly half of girls said that their primary coping method is to stay at home by themselves – and only 5% said that they cope by spending time with friends (vs. 22% for boys). Search for Common Ground (2014) observed, based on their survey of young people aged 15 to 25, that while Syrian boys and young men are coping with dislocation and growing hostility by working – and therefore at least know that they are contributing to their families’ wellbeing – Syrian girls have only minimal coping mechanisms. They ‘constantly feel depressed and lack the hope to flourish’. These findings are largely echoed by DeJong et al. (2017) who add that Syrian girls’ lives are also

![Figure 17: Psychosocial wellbeing questions, by sex and school type](image-url)

Source: WHO, 2011a,b,c

173 Abdel-Khalek, 2014
174 Khawaja et al., 2006
175 Caabu, 2015
176 Search for Common Ground, 2014: 20
increasingly complicated by the strict rules imposed on them by their brothers.

While there is a small silver lining, in that nearly 60% of girls think that their family solidarity has improved since arriving in Lebanon, 90% of girls report spending less time with their friends since arrival and 80% report less communication with friends since arrival. Indeed, just 3% of Syrian girls between the ages of 15 and 18 report spending any leisure time with their friends\(^{177}\) (see Figure 18). Even the internet does not provide them with a window to the larger world. Only 1% of girls use it for recreation – even though 36% of girls between the ages of 15 and 24 have a mobile phone of their own (compared to 50% of boys).

As DeJong et al. (2017), Search for Common Ground (2014), UNFPA et al. (2014) and Anera (2014) note, the relationship between Syrian young people and their peers in host communities is complicated. It is coloured not only by past conflict but is exacerbated by recent economic tensions. The end result is increasingly dark, with Syrian young people reporting that they are ‘constantly humiliated’\(^{178}\) – in part due to mixed-sex classes and Lebanese young people admitting to fear and prejudice against Syrians\(^{179}\) – and incidences of actual conflict on the rise. Syrian refugees’ experiences with host community prejudice and violence are highly gendered. For example, Search for Common Ground (2014) observes that boys and young men are far more likely to be involved in conflict than girls and young women – in part because they see conflict as simply an ‘ordinary’ part of life. However, given communities’ strong patriarchal norms, Search for Common Ground also points out that girls and young women may simply not be able to openly relate their experiences with conflict. Anera (2014) adds that for Syrian girls, the mobility constraints that their families have placed on them due to apparently unfounded but widespread rumours of kidnapping and prostitution have added to their isolation.

### 2.4.3 Palestine refugee girls

There is very little information available about the psychosocial wellbeing of Palestine refugee girls, regardless of whether they are longer-term residents of Lebanon or from Syria, although much can be assumed given the hostility and poverty they endure because they are Palestinian. We were able to locate only two recent studies.

The first, by Afifi et al. (2013) found that of adolescents living in refugee camps (half of whom were girls and with an average age of 15), nearly all (97.5%) reported at least some level of uncertainty about security. This was primarily about the overall macro-security of the Palestine refugee situation in Lebanon rather than about their own personal security. It also found, however, that despite high levels of uncertainty, adolescents expressed very little hopelessness. Indeed, Afifi et al. (2013) observed that Palestine refugee adolescents had a 50% lower experience of hopelessness than residents in some inner-city neighbourhoods of Alabama. They also noted that where young people were worried about their own personal security, they were more likely to be hopeless.

![Figure 18: How young Syrians spend their leisure time, by age and sex](source: UNFPA et al., 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>15-18</th>
<th>19-24</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>15-18</th>
<th>19-24</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spend time with family</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch television</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend time with friends</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit family / friends</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go out</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Play cards</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend time on computer / internet</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{177}\) UNFPA et al., 2014  
\(^{178}\) Search for Common Ground, 2014  
\(^{179}\) UNFPA et al., 2014
Afifi et al. (2016) used adolescent-mother dyads (40 pairs, 2/3 girls, average age of 13) to explore stress and communal coping in Lebanon’s Palestine refugee population. They found that while 80% of adolescents had experienced at least once traumatic event, children and their parents ‘perceived their situation as normal, which enabled them to cope’. They also, however, found that this normalisation of struggle often prevented adolescents and parents from joining forces with one another and the broader community to cope more communally. Adolescents and parents reported that there were high levels of mistrust within the community, which prevented young people from forming strong relationships with one another. More alarmingly, they also reported significant problems in terms of parents and children communicating with one another – usually because of ‘protective buffering’, i.e. trying to keep their fears to themselves in order to protect the other. Parents tried to shield their children from the ‘harsh realities’ of life in Lebanon’s camps, and children believed that talking about their stress would only make it worse. Adolescents also felt that their parents’ emphasis on education was sometimes too much – as it placed the responsibility for improving the future on their own shoulders, often without the more practical homework support that would help make it possible.

In terms of broader work that included adolescent girls, the 2011 MICS found that of Palestine refugee girls and young women aged 15 to 24, 54% were satisfied with life. Education and satisfaction were directly related, with the most educated the most likely to be satisfied and the least educated the least likely to be satisfied.

### 2.5 Voice and agency

Research focused on the voice and agency of adolescent girls living in Lebanon is effectively non-existent. Search for Common Ground’s 2014 survey, which included both Lebanese and Syrian girls (and young women) between the ages of 15 and 25, appears to be the only study which has asked specific questions about girls’ decision-making. It found that girls and young women in both communities are ‘greatly influenced by societal perceptions’ and ‘their decision-making, problem-solving skills, future ambitions and goals are being shaped in a matter that will be accepted by their society’. Constrained by the region’s strong patriarchal norms – as well as age-hierarchies that emphasise obedience and ‘vertical’ parent-child communication – girls admitted that they felt obliged to do as they were expected. That said, it is also possible, because Lebanon is the most diverse of the region’s countries in terms of religious and cultural traditions, that the experiences of adolescent girls living there are more disparate than those of their peers living in other MENA countries.

While Search for Common Ground (2014) did not disaggregate between populations of girls, they found that 80% of Lebanese and Syrian girls and young women between the ages of 15 and 25 were not allowed to leave home whenever they wished, compared to 29% of boys and young men (see Figure 19). Syrian respondents’
mobility was more restricted than that of the Lebanese respondents. Search for Common Ground (2014) also found that only about half of girls and young women felt that they had any role to play in their communities – with those in focus group discussions ‘expressing that they are too young’ (which was roughly the same for boys and young men). (See Figure 20.) This is especially notable because while the average age of participants in the study was only 19.2 years, over one-third of Lebanese participants were university students, or graduates, (compared to only 4% of Syrians), who are presumably the most empowered of their generation.

2.5.1 Lebanese girls
Search for Common Ground’s 2014 survey found that while Lebanese boys and young men accept responsibility for their own decisions after receiving parental advice, Lebanese girls and young women do not see their decisions as their own. Rather, they see their parents as ‘leading them to the right choices’.183 Girls especially rely on their mothers for advice.

Lebanese girls’ access to voice and agency must be understood in the context of Lebanese women’s access to voice and agency – and as Search For Common Ground (2017) notes, that context is complicated. On the one hand, Lebanese women ‘appear to enjoy some of the greatest rights and freedoms of any women in the Middle East.184 However ... a closer look reveals that women’s rights and freedoms remain limited.’185

SWMENA’s 2010 research directly explored many of the tensions surrounding women’s decision-making and participation. For example, in terms of more personal freedom, SWMENA186 found that only 60% of Lebanese women felt ‘completely’ free to leave home without permission. Of younger women, those between the ages of 18 and 24, only 38% felt ‘completely’ free. On the other hand, 81% of women felt ‘completely’ free to express their opinions to family and friends and 87% to associate with whomever they wanted. While Lebanese women are unlikely to work outside of the home in practice (see below), almost 86% of married men indicated that they were comfortable with their wives working – although most admitted that they would be ‘very’ uncomfortable if their wives earned more than they did. Furthermore, almost 40% of women – and 55% of men – believed that when jobs are scarce men have more right to them than women. Even among women with a graduate-level education, more than one-in-five believed that men have more right to work than women. Evidencing Lebanon’s great diversity, while 39% of adult women believed ‘strongly’ that a good wife must always obey her husband even if she disagrees, 41% disagreed equally strongly. Nearly 60% of men, on the other hand, ‘strongly’ felt that women should always obey their husbands.

Figure 20: Surveyed youth have a role to play in their communities

Source: Search for Common Ground, 2014

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183 Search for Common Ground, 2014: 26
184 Search for Common Ground, 2017
185 IFES and IWPR, 2010c
In terms of civic participation, SWMENA found that only 18% of Lebanese women are a member of at least one organisation, with more educated women more likely to join. It also found that over the last 12 months, 11% of women had participated in a protest or a demonstration, with young women aged 18 to 24 more likely to have done so than their older peers. While only 4 of Lebanon's 128 parliament members are female – and female political candidates tend to come from a handful of political families and succeed their male relatives after death – expressed support for female political candidates is strong. Just over three-quarters of SWMENA's female respondents said that they 'strongly' supported women candidates (compared to 66%) of men. Furthermore, 70% of women and 64% of men reported that they would 'strongly' support their own daughter to run for parliament. Christian respondents were the most supportive in both cases. Of the women who said that they would not support their daughter to run, most said that it was because of broader problems with the Lebanese political system – not because of gender. Two of the top three reasons men gave for non-support, on the other hand, centred around gender norms. Women in Lebanon are actually slightly more likely to vote than men. They also believe that they have more political voice and are more likely to make a difference in terms of influencing political leaders.

Several of SWMENA’s questions about decision-making are more directly applicable to adolescent girls. For example, adults were asked if they would allow their daughters to work outside of the home. Overwhelmingly they said yes. Only 3% of women and 11% of men said that they would not allow their daughters to work outside of the home. Of the women who said that they would not, 46% indicated that it was because women should tend to home and children, 29% because it was too dangerous and 10% because there were no appropriate jobs. Men on the other hand, emphasised home and children – 71% listed it as a reason. SWMENA respondents were also asked about who should choose marriage partners. The results were telling (see Figure 21). On the one hand, both women and men overwhelmingly agreed that both women and men must have the right to choose their own partner. On the other hand, respondents were also nearly universally agreed that parents should ‘guide’ the process.

### 2.5.2 Syrian girls

There appears to have been no research directly aimed at scoping out Syrian girls’ access to voice and agency, outside of Search for Common Ground's 2014 survey, which found that Syrian girls, like their Lebanese peers, rely on their parents to ‘lead them to the right choices’. That said, research on school enrolment decisions, child marriage and mobility patterns – all of which come at the question of girls’ agency from an empirical perspective – suggests that Syrian girls have only the most minimal ability to make decisions about their own lives. As UNFPA et al. (2014) observe, girls and young women understand that the decisions that their parents are making for them are putatively in their own best interests – and they are wary of adding to their parents’ already considerable stress by speaking up at all.

![Figure 21: Who chooses marriage partners?](source: IFES and IWPR, 2010d)
2.5.3 Palestine refugee girls
We were unable to locate any sources that spoke to the voice and agency of Palestine refugee girls in Lebanon – or even to the larger space open to women or adolescents.

2.6 Economic empowerment
Shaped by cultural norms that largely preclude women’s employment – and make marriage and motherhood central to their lives – there appears to have been little research focused on women’s access to economic empowerment in Lebanon. Adolescent girls’ access is effectively unexplored. Not only do we not know whether they are allowed to control their own incomes or whether they have access to financial education and services, but even figures about their labour force participation are sadly out of date.

2.6.1 Lebanese girls
Lebanese adolescent girls and young women are very unlikely to engage in economic activity. This is partly because they are likely to be in school through university, partly due to the country’s high rate of youth unemployment and partly because social norms dictate that girls (and women) should not work. In 2009, which notably is the last year for which government figures are available, only 7% of girls between the ages of 15 and 19 were working, compared to 28% of boys the same age (see Figure 22). That same year, adolescent girls were nearly twice as likely as boys to be unemployed (30% vs. 17%) (see Figure 23). More recent

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Figure 22: Economic activity by age and sex

![Economic activity by age and sex](chart1)

Source: Global Communities, 2016 (Data from CAS, 2009)

Figure 23: Unemployment rates by age and sex

![Unemployment rates by age and sex](chart2)

Source: Global Communities, 2016 (Data from CAS, 2009)

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Global Communities, 2016; Search for Common Ground, 2014
World Bank figures suggest there may have been recent improvements. In 2017, unemployment rates for youth aged 15 to 24 were 24.7% for women and 19.6% for men.\footnote{Modeled ILO estimate}

Global Communities (2016) notes that despite the fact that Lebanese girls and young women have low employment rates, like their male peers they are largely uninterested in the technical and vocational education and training programmes (TVET) that might better prepare them for the types of jobs which are available. Global Communities observes that this is because TVET is ‘perceived as a parallel system to the general education stream which provides education to school dropouts, the socially underprivileged and individuals who wish to acquire a trade to facilitate quick entry into the labour market.’\footnote{Global Communities, 2016: 51} While girls and young women make up 44% of TVET students – compared to 41% in 2003 – the path is not popular.

There appears to be no information about Lebanese adolescent girls’ access to financial assets or services. Indeed, with no Department of Homeland Security, or equivalent, and a government which has not prioritised gendered statistics, the vast majority of what is known about even Lebanese women’s access to economic empowerment comes from the 2010 SWMENA survey.\footnote{IFES and IWPR, 2010b}

In Lebanon, women’s labour force participation rate was 24% in 2014 – up from 17% in 1990.\footnote{World Bank, 2018} This figure is just over the regional average of 22% and far below the average for all upper-middle income countries, which is 57%. Salameh (2014) reports that Lebanese women are mainly employed in the informal sector, where their employment is unregulated by law, and the services sector, where they all too often work long hours for low pay. Hammoud (2014) observes that women are disproportionately concentrated in fields such as teaching and nursing, which are seen to be more compatible with both ‘their nature and their primary role as mothers and wives’. Salameh (2014) adds that the NGO sector in particular tends to rely on women’s labour – which is problematic for women because ‘donors fail to take into consideration the need for budget lines related to social security and insurance’, and contracts are likely to be short term.\footnote{Salameh, 2014: 4} Of working women, 61% earned less than $500 a month in 2011 – making them more than twice as likely as men to be poorly paid. Even for the same type of work, women are paid an average of 27% less than men.\footnote{IFES and IWPR, 2010b}

Interestingly, given global findings, in Lebanon women are more likely than men to report that they keep their income for their own personal use.\footnote{SWMENA} SWMENA\footnote{SWMENA} found that about 40% of women, and only 27% of men, report that they spend their incomes on themselves. Accordingly, women are less likely than men to report that they spend their incomes on their families (49% vs. 62%). These figures should be interpreted with caution, however, given that in Lebanon, unmarried women are more likely to work than their married peers – and tend to live with their parents (which reduces the need for them to contribute to the household).

Better-off women are more likely than poorer women to keep their incomes for their own use. Nearly all women (89%) in SWMENA’s\footnote{IFES and IWPR, 2010e} survey reported that they felt ‘completely free’ in deciding how to spend their own earnings. In terms of daily spending decisions, among younger women (those aged 18 to 34), 38% of women reported that they made decisions on their own, 16% reported that their husbands made decisions and 44% reported joint decision-making. In regards to major purchases, two-thirds of women reported shared decision-making, with 10% of women saying they made decisions and 22% reporting that their husbands had final say. Less than half of SWMENA’s female respondents had their own savings accounts and less than 40% had land or property titled in their names.\footnote{IFES and IWPR, 2010e}

Lebanon appears to have never conducted a Time Use Survey that would answer questions about the unpaid work in which girls and women tend to engage.

### 2.6.2 Syrian girls

Very little is known about Syrian girls’ access to economic empowerment either. UNFPA et al. (2014) found that 94% of girls between the ages of 15 and 18 are not employed, compared to 61% of boys the same age. The handful of
girls in the survey who reported working for pay worked in agriculture, a facility such as a bakery, or in childcare. Syrian young people tend to be poorly paid, the average salary of those aged 15 to 24 is 44% under the Lebanese minimum wage. Girls make 30% less than boys (ibid.).

The 2016 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon did not disaggregate children’s and adolescents’ work by sex. While it notes that 3% of Syrian children between the ages of five and 14, and 18% of Syrian adolescents between the ages of 15 and 17, reported working for pay – it did not provide separate figures for girls and boys. Children of all ages mostly worked in agriculture and services.

Like their Lebanese peers, adult Syrian women are unlikely to work. The 2016 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon found that while 70% of adult men reported working at least one day in the last month, only 7% of adult women reported working. Of those who reported working, women’s incomes were roughly half those of men – despite the fact that the number of days they worked was similar – and likely because women were clustered in agriculture and services, while men mostly worked in construction ($115 vs. $215).

### 2.6.3 Palestine refugee girls

Palestine refugee girls’ access to economic empowerment is also unexplored. While we know that women’s labour force participation rate is far lower than men’s (16.9% vs. 69.2%), that women’s unemployment rate is higher than men’s (32% vs. 21%), and that women are more likely than men to have contract employment (largely though UNRWA and NGOs, and at 27.4% vs. 10.1%), we know nothing about adolescent girls (or boys) specifically. Of the 314 Palestine refugee students who recently completed short-term vocational courses, we do not know how old they were or whether they were female or male.

PRS show similar patterns. The unemployment rate for men is 48.5% – compared to 68.1% for women. Of those that work, over half of PRS are paid daily. Notably, because women are more likely to work in the formal sector than men, again especially for NGOs and UNRWA, PRS women are more likely to have written contracts than PRS men (12.2% vs. 0.8%).

200 UNHCR et al., 2016
201 Chaaban et al. 2016
202 UNRWA, 2016b
203 Chaaban et al. 2016
3 Actors for change

There are many actors – both Lebanese and international – working to support adolescent girls in Lebanon. These include the Lebanese government, which is moving towards longer-term development goals rather than taking a purely humanitarian response; many UN bodies, including UNHCR, UNRWA, UNFPA, UNICEF and UNESCO; and dozens of international and national NGOs. Very few of these actors, however, have any significant focus on adolescent girls’ gender- and age-specific needs. Most are working with the broader populations of which adolescent girls are a part, e.g. refugees, females, children or youth. Most critically, however, in terms of identifying actors for change, there is little information available online – outside of the UNHCR dashboard. Few national NGOs have the resources to maintain websites, and even international NGOs have sites that are thin on details and often out of date in regards to programming. As a result, this section will be developed over time, working on the ground with service providers themselves.
Conclusions and ways forward

We know comparatively little about adolescent girls in Lebanon. The only capability domain about which we have high-quality evidence that is disaggregated by gender, age and nationality/refugee status is education. While we know that girls are socially isolated and are more likely than boys to be depressed and anxious, we know far more about Syrian refugee girls’ psychosocial wellbeing. There is similarly little research on girls’ physical health and nutrition. Their sexual and reproductive health needs remain particularly opaque, due to conservative gender norms that largely preclude research. We know almost nothing about girls’ bodily integrity and freedom from violence – outside of the fact that Syrian refugee girls are highly vulnerable to child marriage and sexual harassment. Girls’ access to voice and agency and economic empowerment also remain almost completely unexplored.

Two things stand out about the evidence base on adolescent girls living in Lebanon. First, gender is all but invisible amid the country’s sectarian divisions. The Central Administration of Statistics’ English language ‘Gender Statistics’ webpage is a case in point. Nearly every link is to presentations prepared in 2010. Second, Palestine refugee adolescent girls living in Lebanon have been almost entirely overlooked. While granting that the recent census found that the population is a fraction of its original size, and observing that the government’s position on Palestine refugees likely makes research difficult, it is notable that there is almost no evidence on Palestine adolescent girls.

GAGE is poised to begin filling these gaps.

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References


Adolescent girls in Lebanon: The State of the Evidence


Adolescent girls in Lebanon: The State of the Evidence


Annex 1: Methods and sampling information for the most frequently cited work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample size and construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anera (2014) Youth At Risk in Lebanon: The impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on youth from Syria and Lebanese host communities.</td>
<td>Qualitative – individual and group interviews</td>
<td>Approx. 117 young people • youth were age 15 to 25 • 60% female/40% male • youth were Lebanese and Syrian • three governorates: North Lebanon, Bekaa and Nabatiyeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaaban, J., Salti, N., Ghattas, H., Irani, A., Ismail, T. and Batlouni, L. (2016) Survey on the Socioeconomic Status of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon 2015.</td>
<td>Quantitative – survey</td>
<td>Palestinians living in Lebanon: • 2,974 households (at least partially completed) • geographically targeted – includes camps and outside camp areas with high Palestinian populations Palestinians from Syria: • 1,060 households (at least partially completed) • geographically targeted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and The Institute for Women’s Policy Research (IWPR) with funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) The Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa (SWMENA) Project (2010)</td>
<td>Quantitative – survey</td>
<td>2,750 total individuals (2,000 women/750 men) • all 18+ (approx. one-fifth under age 25) • regional breakdown proportional to national population • three-quarters urban • 52% Muslim/43% Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps (2014) ADVANCING ADOLESCENCE: getting Syrian refugee and host-community adolescents back on track.</td>
<td>Qualitative – focus group discussions</td>
<td>150 Syrian and host-community adolescents • adolescents aged 14 to 18 • 50% female/50% male • two locations in Lebanon: Saida and Baalbeck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search for Common Ground (2014) BETTER TOGETHER A YOUTH-LED APPROACH TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN LEBANON.</td>
<td>Mixed methods – individual interviews, focus group discussions, survey</td>
<td>Survey completed by 200 youth aged 15-25 • youth were Lebanese and Syrian • 30 group interviews with youth • work took place in two locations: North Bekaa and the South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNHCR and Save the Children (2014) Situation Analysis of Youth in Lebanon Affected by the Crisis.</td>
<td>Mixed methods – individual interviews, focus group discussions, survey</td>
<td>Youth aged 15-24 • survey with 986 Syrian refugee youth • group discussions with 135 Syrian refugees youths and 83 Lebanese youths • individual interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO (2011) Global school-based student health survey 2011.</td>
<td>Quantitative – survey</td>
<td>Students in 7th, 8th, 9th grades • nationally representative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About GAGE
Gender and Adolescence: Global Evidence (GAGE) is a nine-year longitudinal research programme generating evidence on what works to transform the lives of adolescent girls in the Global South. Visit www.gage.odi.org.uk for more information.

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Front cover: Teenage Syrian girls take part in a discussion about children’s rights, at a community centre in Lebanon © Russell Watkins/Department for International Development